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Abstract
This paper introduces a new class of transferable-utility games, called multi-issue
allocation games. These games arise from various allocation situations and are based
on the concepts underlying the bankruptcy model, as introduced by O'Neill (1982).
In this model, a perfectly divisible good (estate) has to be divided amongst a given
set of agents, each of whom has some claim on the estate. Contrary to the standard
bankruptcy model, the current model deals with situations in which the agents' claims
are multi-dimensional, where the dimensions correspond to various issues.
It is shown that the class of multi-issue allocation games coincides with the class
of (nonnegative) exact games. The run-to-the-bank rule is introduced as a solution for
multi-issue allocation situations and turns out to be Shapley value of the corresponding
game. Finally, this run-to-the-bank rule is characterised by means of a consistency
property.
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11 Introduction
Bankruptcy problems were ¯rst introduced by O'Neill (1982) and have been subsequently
analysed in a variety of contexts. In a bankruptcy situation, one has to divide a given amount
of money (estate) amongst a set of agents, each of whom has a claim on the estate. The total
amount claimed typically exceeds the estate available, so not all the claims of the agents can
be fully satis¯ed.
The example originally given by O'Neill (and which is inspired by some passages in the
Talmud) is that of a bequest: a man dies, leaving behind an estate which is not su±ciently
large to satisfy all promises made to his heirs in his will. Another example is that of a ¯rm
going bankrupt, whose assets are insu±cient to satisfy all creditors' outstanding claims.
O'Neill proposes a particular solution to this problem, which he calls the method of
recursive completion. This solution turns out to be the Shapley value of a corresponding
bankruptcy game, which is a transferable-utility game where the value of each coalition is
the amount of money that is left of the estate after all the claims of the agents outside
that coalition are satis¯ed. Aumann and Maschler (1985) and Curiel et al. (1987) proposed
and characterised two further solutions that coincide with the nucleolus and ¿-value of the
corresponding bankruptcy game, respectively.
O'Neill's bankruptcy model has been applied to a wide array of economic problems, e.g.,
taxation problems (Young (1988)), surplus-sharing problems (Moulin (1987)), cost-sharing
problems (Moulin (1988)), apportionment of indivisible good(s) problems (Young (1994))
and priority problems (Moulin (2000) and Young (1994)).
The bankruptcy model relates to a particular kind of allocation problem. An allocation
problem arises whenever a bundle of goods (resources, rights, costs, burdens) is held in
common by a group of individuals and must be allotted to them individually. An allocation
situation has two ingredients: the goods to be distributed and the claimants amongst whom
they are to be allotted. Young (1994) introduced a general framework with the central
concept of a \type" of a claimant: \The type of a claimant is a complete description of the
claimant for purposes of the allocation, and determines the extent of a claimant's entitlement
to the good". A type of a claimant therefore involves a complete description of the claimant
in several dimensions or attributes. These attributes are accepted as the benchmark against
which allocations are to be judged and can take on many forms, depending on the particular
allocation situation at hand. E.g., the allocation of public housing typically depends on
such attributes as ¯nancial need, family size and time spent on a waiting list. Looking from
this general point of view, one can say that the bankruptcy model deals with all allocation
2problems in which there is one perfectly divisible good (money) to be allocated and the type
of each agent can be characterised by a single (monetary) claim on that good.
In a general rationing framework, Kaminski (2000) also considers bankruptcy situations
in which the type of each claimant is not one-dimensional, as is the case in O'Neill, but multi-
dimensional. In the environment he presents, a type is a vector of claims, the components
of which have di®erent legal statuses. As a result, di®erent priorities are assigned to the
various components of an agent's claim vector.
The model we present in this paper also characterises the types of the claimants in a
multi-dimensional way by means of a vector of claims. Contrary to Kaminski however, the
multidimensionality of claims is not the necessary consequence of some exogenously given
priorities. In our model, we regard each claim component as originating from a particular
issue. An issue, which in the terminology used above takes on the role of attribute, consti-
tutes a reason on the basis of which the estate is to be divided. Crucially, such a reason
should be well founded and be accepted as such by all parties involved. A particular way
one can interpret an issue is in terms of a will. In fact, O'Neill (1982) hints at this point of
view in the bequest example, where the deceased leaves behind not just a single will, but a
number of (contradictory) wills, each of which contains promises to one or more of his heirs.
To illustrate the terminology of our new model, consider the following example. The
central government has to decide how to allocate the taxpayers' money to various public
services. The system of government is such that it doesn't allocate this money directly to
these services, but indirectly through various government departments. Each department
(agent/player) has a number of claims on the amount of money available (estate), arising
from those public services (issues) for which it has responsibility. Some of these services are
provided by just a single department (e.g., tax collection viz. the Department of Finance),
while more departments may be responsible for other services (e.g., foreign trade viz. the
Departments of Economic A®airs, Foreign A®airs and Defence).
Another multi-dimensional extension of the bankruptcy model is provided by Lerner
(1998). In that paper, a pie is allocated amongst groups, not necessarily disjoint, rather
than users.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce multi-issue allocation
situations and de¯ne two corresponding cooperative games. These games are constructed
from a pessimistic point of view, as are standard bankruptcy games. In order to determine
the value of a particular coalition, we let the players outside that coalition decide in which
order the issues are to be addressed. One important assumption in our framework is that
once we start paying out money according to one particular issue, this issue must ¯rst be
3fully dealt with before we move on to the next. As illustrated by our public service example,
handing out the estate takes place primarily on the basis of issues, whereas the individual
claims of the players are of secondary concern. Because of the importance of issues, it seems
natural to assume that they are dealt with consecutively. But that still leaves some freedom
within each issue: in our ¯rst game (called Proportional game), we distribute the money
within each issue proportional to the claims in that issue, while in the second game (called
Queue game), we take an even more pessimistic view by allowing the players outside the
coalition to choose also the order in which the claims within each issue are satis¯ed.
The computation of the second of our multi-issue allocation games turns out to be a
less than straightforward combinatorial optimisation problem. In the Appendix, we provide
algorithms to determine the worth of coalitions in both approaches.
Properties of multi-issue allocation games are presented in Section 3. The main result is
that the class of multi-issue allocation games coincides with the class of non-negative exact
games.
In Section 4, we analyse run-to-the-bank rules as solutions for multi-issue allocation situa-
tions. These rules are based on the interpretation behind the method of recursive completion
for bankruptcy situations (cf. O'Neill (1982)). As the name suggests, the players hold a race
to the person or institution administering the estate. Upon arrival, each player can choose
an order on the issues that is most favourable to him. By averaging over all possible orders
of arrival, we obtain a run-to-the-bank rule. One new aspect of this kind of rule, which is
not present in the method of recursive completion, is that new players arriving do not only
take into account their own payo®s, but also have to make some compensation payments.
The two run-to-the-bank rules we introduce in this fashion di®er in the way they treat
claims within each issue. The ¯rst one (the P-rule) divides the money assigned to a particular
issue proportionally, while the second one (the Q-rule) chooses an \optimistic" order on the
players. The two run-to-the-bank rules turn out to be the Shapley value of the corresponding
P-game and Q-game, respectively.
Finally, in Section 5, we characterise both run-to-the-bank rules by means of (P- and
Q-)consistency. In the context of bankruptcy games, the term consistency has been used
for a number of di®erent properties. Our de¯nition of consistency is similar to the one used
by O'Neill (1982). It is based on the idea that applying a solution concept to a particular
problem and applying the same solution concept to some speci¯c subproblems and aggregat-
ing the solutions of these subproblems should yield the same outcome. In order to properly
de¯ne such a consistency property, we extend the domain of a solution concept to a wider
class of problems, i.e., the class of multi-issue allocation situations with awards.
42 The Model
A cooperative game with transferable utility, or TU-game, is described by a pair (N;v), where
N = f1;:::;ng denotes the set of players and v : 2N ! R is the characteristic function,
assigning to every coalition S ½ N of players a value v(S), representing the total monetary
payo® the members of this group can obtain when they cooperate. By convention, v(;) = 0.
A bankruptcy situation (cf. O'Neill (1982)) is a triple (N;E;c), where N = f1;:::;ng is
the set of players, E > 0 is the estate to be divided and c 2 RN
++ is the vector of claims
such that
P
i2N ci > E. Every bankruptcy situation (N;E;c) gives rise to a bankruptcy game
(N;v), where the value of a coalition S ½ N is given by




So v(S) is that part of the estate that is left for the players in S after the claims of all other
players have been satis¯ed.
A multi-issue allocation situation is a triple (N;E;C), where N = f1;:::;ng is the set
of players, E > 0 is the estate under contest and C 2 Rr£n
+ is the matrix of claims. Every
row in C represents an issue and the set of issues is denoted by R = f1;:::;rg. An element
cki > 0 represents the amount that player i 2 N claims according to issue k 2 R. If a player
is not involved in a particular issue, his claim corresponding to that issue equals zero.
Every bankruptcy situation (N;E;c) gives rise to a multi-issue allocation situation with
C 2 Rn£n the diagonal matrix with the claims ci on the diagonal. 1
With respect to the matrix of claims C, we assume the following:
² Every issue gives rise to a claim:
P
i2N cki > 0 for all k 2 R.
² Every player is involved in at least one issue:
P
k2R cki > 0 for all i 2 N.




i2N cki > E.
For ease of notation, we de¯ne ck =
P
i2N cki to be the total of claims according to issue
k 2 R. Similarly, we de¯ne ckS =
P
i2S cki for all coalitions S ½ N and cKi =
P
k2K cki for
all sets of issues K ½ R. An ordering of the players in N is a bijection ¾ : f1;:::;ng ! N,
where ¾(i) denotes which player in N is at position i. The set of all n! permutations of N
is denoted by ¦(N). Similarly, the set of permutations of the set of issues R is denoted by
¦(R).
1In fact, one can generalise a bankruptcy situation in more than one way. The method described here is
one that results in the same game for both approaches we follow in this paper.
5As stated in the introduction, we make the basic assumption that once we are paying out
money according to one particular issue, this issue must ¯rst be fully dealt with before we
move on to the next. In addition, we consider two approaches on how to handle the claims
within each issue. As a result, we de¯ne two multi-issue allocation games, a proportional
game vP based on Assumption 2.1 and a queue game vQ based on Assumption 2.2.
Assumption 2.1 If some money is allocated to the players on the basis of a particular
issue, the amount of money each of the players gets is proportional to his claim according
to that issue.
In order to de¯ne the proportional game vP, we ¯rst compute the maximum amount the
players in a coalition S ½ N can get when the issues are dealt with according to Assump-
tion 2.1. We do this by considering all orders on the issues, so let ¿ 2 ¦(R). Now the players
in S ¯rst address the ¯rst t issues completely, where t = maxft0 j
Pt0
s=1c¿(s) 6 Eg. The part
of the estate that is left, E0 = E ¡
Pt
s=1c¿(s), is divided proportional to the claims according











The value of coalition S ½ N is the amount of money they get when the players in NnS
choose that order on the issues that gives them the highest payo®:
v





Using the identity fP
S (¿) + fP







The queue game vQ is based on Assumption 2.2.
Assumption 2.2 If a particular coalition allocates some money to the players on the basis
of a particular issue, this coalition can also decide in which order the claims corresponding
to that issue are satis¯ed.
To de¯ne the queue game, we ¯rst de¯ne an auxiliary function g(S;k;¾;E0), which describes
how much money the players in S ½ N get according to issue k 2 R if the order on the
players is ¾ 2 ¦(N) and the estate is E0 with E0 < ck. The ¯rst q players get their entire
claim, where q = maxfq0 j
Pq0
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ck¾(p) if ¾(q + 1) = 2 S
(2.3)
The computation of g(S;k;¾;E0) is illustrated in the following example with ¯ve players.
0 E0 ck




















Coalition S consists of players ¾(1), ¾(3) and ¾(4) and corresponds to the shaded area. The
estate E0 is such that only the claims of ¯rst three players can be fully satis¯ed (q = 3).
Furthermore, ¾(q + 1) 2 S, so (2.3) yields g(S;k;¾;E0) = E0 ¡ ck¾(2), the area to the left of
E0 that is not claimed by NnS.
Next, we compute the maximum amount the players in a coalition S ½ N can get if the
order on the issues is ¿ 2 ¦(R) . As in the proportional case, the ¯rst t issues are fully dealt







c¿(s);S + g(S;¿(t + 1);¾;E
0):
The value of coalition S is then given by
v







Again, using the identity f
Q
S (¾;¿) + f
Q










It is immediately clear that the optimal order on the players that coalition NnS will choose
puts the players of NnS in front. So, (2.4) reduces to
v















7with ^ ¾ 2 ¦(N) such that ^ ¾¡1(NnS) = f1;:::;jNnSjg.
In the appendix, we present two algorithms to compute vP and vQ given any multi-issue
allocation situation (N;E;C).
3 Properties of Multi-issue Allocation Games
In this section we look at some of the properties that multi-issue allocation games of both
types possess. First, we prove that the worth of a coalition in the queue game is smaller
than the worth of that coalition in the corresponding proportional game. This means that
the queue approach is more pessimistic than the proportional approach.
Proposition 3.1 Let (N;E;C) be a multi-issue allocation situation with corresponding
games (N;vP) and (N;vQ). Then vQ(S) 6 vP(S) for all S ½ N.
Proof: Let S ½ N and let ¿± 2 ¦(R) be the order on the issues where the maximum in
(2.2) is obtained. For any order ¿ 2 ¦(R), minfc¿(t+1);NnS;E0g in (2.5) exceeds
c¿(t+1);NnS
c¿(t+1) E0




NnS(¿±) and hence, vQ(S) 6 vP(S). ¤
The core of a TU-game (N;v) is de¯ned as








and (N;v) is called exact (cf. Driessen and Tijs (1985)) if for all S ½ N there exists an
x 2 C(v) such that
P
i2S xi = v(S).
Theorem 3.2 Let (N;E;C) be a multi-issue allocation situation. Then both corresponding
games (N;vP) and (N;vQ) are exact.
Proof: Let S ½ N and let ¿± 2 ¦(R) be such that fP




i2N xi = E = vP(N) and
P
i2T xi = fP
T (¿±) > min¿2¦(R) fP
T (¿) = vP(T)
for all coalitions T ½ N. So, x 2 C(vP). Furthermore,
P
i2S xi = fP
S (¿±) = vP(S). Hence,
(N;vP) is exact. The proof for (N;vQ) is similar. ¤
In the proof of Theorem 3.2 we showed that (fP
i (¿±))i2N is a core element of the proportional
game vP for certain ¿± 2 ¦(R). This property can be extended to all orders on the issues,
so for all ¿ 2 ¦(R) we have
8(f
P
i (¿))i2N 2 C(v
P)
and similarly for the queue game, for all ¿ 2 ¦(R) and ¾ 2 ¦(N),
(f
Q
i (¾;¿))i2N 2 C(v
Q):
Theorem 3.3 Let (N;v) be a nonnegative exact game. Then there exists a multi-issue
allocation situation (N;E;C) such that both corresponding games vP and vQ equal v.
Proof: If jNj = 1, the result is obvious. Otherwise, de¯ne E = v(N) and take for all
S $ N;S 6= ; an xS 2 C(v) such that
P
i2S = v(S). Interpret these core elements as issues
and gather them (as rows) in the (2n¡2)£n claim matrix C. Because
P
i2N cki = E for all
k 2 R, no issue is addressed partially and vP and vQ coincide.
Now, let S ½ N. By construction, there is a row k0 2 R such that ck0S = v(S) and because
all issues are core elements of v, ckS > v(S) for all k 2 R. Hence, vP(S) = min¿2¦(R)fP
S (¿) =
mink2R ckS = v(S). Therefore, v, vP and vQ coincide. ¤
From Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 we conclude that the class of multi-issue allocation games coin-
cides with the class of nonnegative exact games.
A TU-game (N;v) is called balanced if it has a nonempty core and totally balanced if
the core of every subgame is nonempty, where the subgame corresponding to some coalition
T ½ N;T 6= ; is the game (T;V T) with V T(S) = V (S) for all S ½ T.
Proposition 3.4 Let (N;v) be an exact TU-game. Then (N;v) is totally balanced.
Proof: Let T ½ N;T 6= ;. By exactness, there exists an x 2 C(v) such that
P
i2T xi = v(T).
But then xT 2 RT is an e±cient allocation of vT(T) such that xS > vT(S) for all S ½ T.
Hence, xT 2 C(vT) and (N;v) is totally balanced. ¤
As a corollary, both multi-issue allocation games are totally balanced.
A TU-game (N;v) is called superadditive if for all coalitions S;T ½ N we have
v(S) + v(T) 6 v(S [ T)
and convex if for all coalitions U ½ N and all S ½ T ½ NnU we have
v(S [ U) ¡ v(S) 6 v(T [ U) ¡ v(T):
For a TU-game (N;v), the utopia vector M(v) is de¯ned by
9Mi(v) = v(N) ¡ v(Nnfig)










for all i 2 N. (N;v) is called quasi-balanced if m(v) 6 M(v) and
P
i2N mi(v) 6 v(N) 6
P
i2N Mi(v). The following proposition comes from Driessen and Tijs (1985).
Proposition 3.5 Let (N;v) be a TU-game with x 2 C(v). Then (N;v) is quasi-balanced
and m(v) 6 x 6 M(v).
For an arbitrary game (N;v), we de¯ne the core cover by




xi = v(N);m(v) 6 x 6 M(v)g:
It follows from Proposition 3.5 that CC(v) ¾ C(v). A TU-game (N;v) is called semi-convex
if it is superadditive and
mi(v) = v(fig)
for all i 2 N.
For every order ¾ 2 ¦(N), we de¯ne the marginal vector m¾(v) recursively by
m
¾
¾(k)(v) = v(f¾(1);:::;¾(k)g) ¡ v(f¾(1);:::;¾(k ¡ 1)g)








The following results come from Driessen and Tijs (1985).
Proposition 3.6 Let (N;v) be a TU-game. Then:
² If (N;v) is convex, then it is exact.
² If (N;v) is exact, then it is semi-convex.
² If (N;v) is semi-convex and jNj 6 3, then it is convex.
10As a corollary, both multi-issue allocation games vP and vQ are semi-convex (and hence, su-
peradditive) and multi-issue allocation games with 3 players or less are convex. Example 3.7
shows that 4-player multi-issue allocation games need not be convex.
Example 3.7 Consider the multi-issue allocation situation with player set N = f1;:::4g,
estate E = 12 and claim matrix
C =
"
4 0 0 4
4 4 4 4
#
:
The corresponding proportional and queue games are as follows:
S 1 2 3 4 12 13 14 23 24 34 123 124 134 234 N
vP(S) 3 1 1 3 6 6 6 2 6 6 7 9 9 7 12
vQ(S) 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 0 4 4 4 8 8 4 12
Now take U = f3g, S = f1g and T = f1;2g. Then
v
P(S [ U) ¡ v
P(S) = 6 ¡ 3 = 3 > 1 = 7 ¡ 6 = v




Q(S [ U) ¡ v
Q(S) = 4 ¡ 0 = 4 > 0 = 4 ¡ 4 = v
Q(T [ U) ¡ v
Q(T):
Hence, both vP and vQ do not satisfy convexity. /
A well known property of a convex game is that its Shapley value belongs to the core. Rabie
(1981) shows that this does not hold in general for exact games. However, Theorem 3.8
shows that the Shapley value of a nonnegative exact game belongs to the core cover.
Theorem 3.8 Let (N;v) be a nonnegative exact game. Then ©(v) 2 CC(v).
Proof: First, use Theorem 3.3 to construct a multi-issue allocation situation (N;E;C)
such that vP = v. Next, let i 2 N. Then supperadditivity implies vP(S) ¡ vP(Snfig) >






















































Hence, the marginal contribution of i to every coalition S : i 2 S is bounded by mi(vP)
and Mi(vP). Because the Shapley value is the average of these marginal contributions,
©(vP) 2 CC(vP) and hence, ©(v) 2 CC(v). ¤
A population monotonic allocation scheme (cf. Sprumont (1990)), or pmas, is a set of vectors











i for all S ½ T ½ N;i 2 S: (3.2)
Sprumont shows that every convex game has a pmas. This does not hold for exact games,
as is shown by the following example.
Example 3.9 Consider the multi-issue allocation situation with player set N = f1;:::;4g,
estate E = 22 and claim matrix
C =
"
6 6 5 3
12 0 2 6
#
:
The corresponding queue game is as follows:
S 1 2 3 4 12 13 14 23 24 34 123 124 134 234 N
vQ(S) 6 0 2 3 12 11 9 2 6 8 14 15 16 8 22
To show that vQ has no pmas, suppose (xS
i )i2S;S½N;S6=; satis¯es (3.1) and (3.2). Then we
subsequently have:
² vQ(f1;3g) = 11 and vQ(f1;3;4g) imply x
f1;3;4g
4 6 16 ¡ 11 = 5.
² x
f1;3;4g















The last statement contradicts (3.1) and hence, the exact game vQ possesses no pmas. /
124 The Run-to-the-Bank Rule
A multi-issue allocation solution ª is a function assigning to every multi-issue allocation
situation (N;E;C) a vector ª(N;E;C) 2 RN such that
P
i2N ªi(N;E;C) = E (e±ciency)
and 0 6 ªi(N;E;C) 6 cRi for all i 2 N (reasonability). We de¯ne two solutions, called
run-to-the-bank rules, based on Assumption 2.1 and 2.2. The proportional run-to-the bank





























for all p 2 f1;:::;ng. The vector ½P(¾) is interpreted as follows. To divide the estate, a
\race" is held between the players and they arrive at the person or institution administering
the estate in the order given by ¾. The ¯rst player that arrives, ¾(1), can choose the order in
which the issues are dealt with and receives his payo® accordingly. Of course, he will choose
that order ¿ 2 ¦(R) for which his payo® fP
¾(1)(¿) is maximal. Next, player ¾(2) arrives
and he is asked to do the same. However, if he chooses an order di®erent from the ¯rst
one, he has to compensate player ¾(1) for the di®erence between his settled payo® ½P
¾(1)(¾)
and his payo® according to the new order. Taking this into account, the second player will
pick that order that maximises his own payo® minus corresponding compensation payments.
The same procedure is applied to each subsequent player, each having to compensate all his
predecessors.































for all p 2 f1;:::;ng. The interpretation is similar to the proportional case. The only
di®erence is that the queue payo® function fQ is used rather than the proportional function
fP and that in accordance with Assumption 2.2, players also have to specify an order ° on
the players. It is immediately clear that it is optimal for player ¾(p), who arrives at the
13administrator at position p, to choose ° in such a way that he himself and all preceding
players, ¾(1);:::;¾(p¡1), whom he has to compensate, are in front of the queue. This can
be done by setting ° = ¾.
Proposition 4.1 The optimal ° in (4.2) equals ¾.




















In order to prove that both run-to-the-bank rules equal the Shapley values of their respective
corresponding games, we ¯rst relate them to the marginal vectors. For this, we de¯ne for any
order ¾ 2 ¦(N) the reverse order ¾¤ 2 ¦(N) by ¾¤(p) = ¾(n¡p+1) for all p 2 f1;:::;ng.
Lemma 4.2 Let (N;E;C) be a multi-issue allocation situation with corresponding games
(N;vP) and (N;vQ). Then ½P(¾) = m¾¤(vP) and ½Q(¾) = m¾¤(vQ) for all ¾ 2 ¦(N).
Proof: We only prove the statement for the proportional game; the proof for the queue




























































¤(n ¡ p)g) + v
P(f¾
¤(1);:::;¾









where the third equality follows from recursively substituting the formulas for ½P
¾(q)(¾). ¤
Theorem 4.3 Let (N;E;C) be a multi-issue allocation situation with corresponding games
(N;vP) and (N;vQ). Then ½P = ©(vP) and ½Q = ©(vQ).
14Proof: This result follows immediately from Lemma 4.2 and from the observation that
f¾¤j¾ 2 ¦(N)g = ¦(N). ¤
5 Consistency
In this section we characterise the run-to-the-bank rules by means of consistency. For this,
we broaden the domain of these rules to a larger class of situations, namely multi-issue
allocation situations with awards. We should stress, that although this new class has a nice
interpretation in itself, it is not directly intended as an extension of multi-issue allocation
situations, but as a (technical) framework in which consistency arises as a natural property.
A multi-issue allocation situation with awards is a 4-tuple (N;E;C;¹), where ¹ 2 RF
represents some award vector to a coalition F ½ N, which has already been agreed upon. The
sum of these awards cannot exceed the estate, so
P
i2F ¹i 6 E. Furthermore,
P
i2F ¹i = E
if F = N. Note that a multi-issue allocation situation without awards is a special case with
F = ;.
A solution ª is a function assigning to every multi-issue allocation situation with
awards (N;E;C;¹) a vector ª(N;E;C;¹) 2 RN such that
P
i2N ªi(N;E;C;¹) = E and
ªF(N;E;C;¹) = ¹. That is, for a solution in this environment it should hold that every
player in F gets exactly his award. Note that contrary to the situation without awards,
we do not impose reasonability 2 on ª. On this new class of situations we also de¯ne two
run-to-the-bank rules. For this, we ¯rst ¯x an order on the players in F, so let ° 2 ¦(F).













¾ 2 ¦(N)j8q2f1;:::;jFjg : ¾(q) = °(q)
o




for all p 2 f1;:::;ng such that ¾(p) 2 F and
2To guarantee reasonability of the run-to-the-bank rules with awards as de¯ned below, we would have
to make some unnecessary diverting assumptions. We just note that for the speci¯c multi-issue allocation
situations with awards that are derived from a standard multi-issue allocation situation using either run-to-






















for all p 2 f1;:::;ng such that ¾(p) = 2 F.
Note that the run-to-the-bank rule does not depend on the actual choice of °. This
de¯nition di®ers from the run-to-the-bank rule without awards (4.1) in two respects: every
player i 2 F gets ¹i rather than the maximum expression in (4.1) and the players in F have
to be compensated (which is accomplished in an order ¾ 2 ¦°(N) by putting them at the
front). Note that for F = ;, the two de¯nitions coincide.



































for all p 2 f1;:::;ng such that ¾(p) = 2 F. Note that this de¯nition generalises (4.3) rather
than (4.2). Proposition 4.1 can easily be extended to the situation with awards, so letting
each player choose an order on the players would result in an equivalent de¯nition.
For all i 2 NnF and ¿ 2 ¦(R) we de¯ne the remainder functions
r
P






















where ¾ 2 ¦°(N) is such that ¾(jFj + 1) = i. These remainder functions represent the
amount of money player i gets according to order ¿, when he has to ensure that every player
j 2 F gets ¹j. A rule ª is called P-consistent if for all multi-issue allocation situations with
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16where ¹j 2 RF[fjg is such that ¹
j
F = ¹ and ¹
j
j = max¿2¦(R)rP
j (¿). ª is Q-consistent if for
























j (¿). The idea behind consistency is as follows (cf. O'Neill (1982)).
Let i be a player in NnF. Then the ¯rst term between parentheses is the amount of money
player i gets when he maximises his own payo® by choosing an order on the issues, keeping in
mind the players in F have to receive their awards. Next, let j 2 NnF;j 6= i. Now suppose
that player j receives his maximal remainder. Then a new situation arises where player j
has been awarded some ¯xed amount. The amount of money player i receives in this new
situation is given by applying rule ª on the old ¹ extended with the ¯xed award to player j.
A rule is called consistent if applying it directly yields the same outcome as averaging over
all jNnFj situations where one of the non-¯xed player get their maximum.
Theorem 5.1 The proportional run-to-the-bank rule ½P is the unique P-consistent rule and
the queue run-to-the-bank rule ½Q is the unique Q-consistent rule.
Proof: We only give the proof for ½P. The proof for ½Q goes along similar lines. First, we
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;
where ¦°;i(N) = f¾ 2 ¦°(N)j¾(jFj + 1) = ig.
Uniqueness of the P-consistent rule is proved by induction on the size of F. Assume that
rule ª is P-consistent. For F = N, ª(N;E;C;¹) = ¹ by de¯nition. Next, let F ½ N;F 6= ;
and assume that ª(N;E;C;¹) is uniquely determined. Let i 2 F. Then P-consistency (5.1)
implies that ª(N;E;C;¹¡i) must be uniquely determined as well, where ¹¡i 2 RFnfig is
such that ¹
¡i
j = ¹j for all j 2 Fnfig. Repeating this procedure until F = ;, we conclude
that there is a unique P-consistent rule, which is the proportional run-to-the-bank rule. ¤
References
Aumann, R.J. and M. Maschler (1985). Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem
from the Talmud. Journal of Economic Theory, 36, pp. 195{213.
Curiel, I.J., M. Maschler, and S.H. Tijs (1987). Bankruptcy Games. Zeitschrift fÄ ur Operations
Research, 31, pp. 143{159.
Driessen, T.S.H. and S.H. Tijs (1985). The ¿-value, the Core and Semiconvex Games. Inter-
national Journal of Game Theory, 14, pp. 229{247.
Kaminski, M.M. (2000). \Hydraulic" Rationing. Mathematical Social Sciences, 40, pp. 131{
155.
Lerner, A. (1998). A Pie Allocation Among Sharing Groups. Games and Economic Behav-
ior, 22, pp. 316{330.
18Moulin, H. (1987). Equal or Proportional Division of a Surplus, and Other Methods. Inter-
national Journal of Game Theory, 16, pp. 161{186.
Moulin, H. (1988). Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Econometric Society Mono-
graphs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Moulin, H. (2000). Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Models. Economet-
rica, 68, pp. 643{684.
O'Neill, B. (1982). A Problem of Rights Arbitration from the Talmud. Mathematical Social
Sciences, 2, pp. 345{371.
Rabie, M.A. (1981). A Note on the Exact Games. International Journal of Game Theory, 10,
pp. 131{132.
Shapley, L. (1953). A Value for n-person Games. In: H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker (Eds.),
Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Volume 28 of Annals of Mathematics Studies.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sprumont, Y. (1990). Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes for Cooperative Games
with Transferable Utility. Games and Economic Behavior, 2, pp. 378{394.
Young, H.P. (1988). Distributive Justice in Taxation. Journal of Economic Theory, 48, pp.
321{335.
Young, H.P. (1994). Equity, in Theory and Practice. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
19A Algorithms
In this appendix we present two algorithms to compute the proportional game vP and queue
game vQ that correspond to any multi-issue allocation situation (N;E;C).
A.1 Proportional Game
Let (N;E;C) be a multi-issue allocation situation and let S ½ N be a coalition of players.
The value of S, vP(S), is computed in a number of steps:
1. Compute for every issue k 2 R the proportion of the total of claims corresponding to




2. Take ¿ 2 ¦(R) such that ¿¡1(k) 6 ¿¡1(`) whenever pk 6 p`.
3. vP(S) = fP
S (¿), where fP
S (¿) is de¯ned in (2.1).
A.2 Queue Game
Let (N;E;C) be a multi-issue allocation situation and let S ½ N be a coalition of players.
The value of S, vQ(S), is computed in a number of steps:











2. If y; > E then vQ(S) = 0, otherwise proceed.
3. Find I ½ R such that
(a) xI + yI > E,
(b) xI > xI for all I ½ R such that xI + yI > E.
Next, ¯nd I ½ R such that
(a) xI + yI 6 E,
20(b) yI > yI for all I ½ R such that xI + yI 6 E.
4. Compute
v
Q(S) = minfxI;E ¡ yIg:
Proof: First of all, note that it follows from the de¯nition of fQ that vQ(S) depends only
on the aggregate claim of coalition S within each issue and not on the distribution of claims
between the members of S.
The idea behind the proof is to represent all possible payo® pro¯les (x;y) for all possible
estates by paths in the payo® space (R2
+), where x (on the horizontal axis) is the payo® to
S and y (on the vertical axis) the payo® to NnS. The aim is to ¯nd the minimum possible
payo® to S given the fact that the estate equals E. The estate E is represented by the line
x + y = E.
Coalition NnS has the freedom to choose an order on the issues. Now, forget the actual
amount of the estate for a moment and suppose that NnS choose to address issues I ½ R
fully and one other issue in R ½ I that gives NnS their maximal payo® (without paying
the claim of S according to that last issue). This action leads to a payo® pro¯le of (xI;yI).
If the estate were to equal xI + yI, the point (xI;yI) would represent a payo® pro¯le that
according to Assumption 2.2 would be feasible for NnS to reach.
With each order on I we associate a path connecting (xI;yI) to the origin. Starting with an
estate of 0 (and hence, a (0;0) payo®), we are going to increase the estate to xI+yI, plotting
the payo® pro¯les associated with all intermediate estates (determined by the order on I)
in the picture. From the origin, we start paying out money to NnS according to the ¯rst
issue in I, represented by a vertical line segment. When the estate reaches the total claim
of NnS corresponding to the ¯rst issue, we start paying out to coalition S, represented by a
horizontal line segment. After the total claim associated with the ¯rst issue has been paid
out, we continue with the second issue in the order, and so on. When all issues I have been
addressed, we end with a vertical line segment representing the claim of NnS according the
last issue. Typically, such a path looks as depicted in Figure 1. Note that some horizontal
or vertical line segments may be absent because of zero claims. We draw such a path for
every order on I. These paths represent all possible payo® pro¯les that coalition NnS can
reach for estates smaller than xI + yI if they choose to address the issues in I ¯rst and put
themselves in front within each issue.
Doing this for all I ½ R yields all feasible payo® pro¯les (provided NnS acts optimally within















Figure 1 Figure 2
Note that every path associated with some set I $ R of issues is part of a path connecting
(xR;yR) to the origin.
The value of coalition S is the x-coordinate of the leftmost intersection between some path
and the line x+y = E. It is immediately clear that vQ(S) = 0 if y; > E. Otherwise, take I
and I as stated (which is always possible because of R and ;, resp.).
Typically, I and I are situated as depicted in Figure 2. By construction, there is no I ½ R
giving rise to a payo® pro¯le (xI;yI) in either shaded are. Note also that whereas I and I



















Figure 3 Figure 4
Now consider the paths associated with I. We claim that there can be no path with a kink
in the shaded area. Suppose that such a path exists, as indicated in Figure 3, with a kink at
A. Consider all issues I¤ that are fully dealt with up to point B. 3 Then by construction,
3In fact, we need the last point below A where all issues up to that point have been fully addressed. If
A is preceded by an issue in which S has a zero claim, this point may be between A and B.
22(xI¤;yI¤) lies at or above point A. This contradicts the fact that there is no I ½ R giving
rise to a payo® pro¯le in the shaded area.
As a consequence, every path connecting (xI;yI) to the origin must cross the line x+y = E
to the right of (E ¡ yI;yI) if xI + yI > E (the case depicted in Figure 3). The same
holds for every path connecting any point above the line x + y = E to the origin. Hence,
vQ(S) > E ¡ yI. Furthermore, there is a path going through (E ¡ yI;yI), because NnS
can guarantee themselves yI by addressing issues I ¯rst. Therefore, vQ(S) = E ¡ yI if
xI + yI > E.
Similarly, if xI +yI < E, as depicted in Figure 4, every path intersecting the line x+y = E
must do so to the right of (xI;E ¡xI) and there is a path going through this point. Hence,
in this case vQ(S) = xI.
If xI + yI = E, both sets of arguments can be used. One should also note that all these
arguments still hold in case (xI;yI) or (xI;yI) lie on the line x + y = E rather than below
or above.
Summarising these cases, we obtain
v
Q(S) = minfxI;E ¡ yIg;
as stated in the algorithm. ¤
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